Xi and Putin at odds over Ukraine endgame
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin’s meeting has raised eyebrows across the world, but it’s important to remember that the two countries are less aligned than they like to portray.
There has been so much nonsense written about the Moscow summit between Russian president Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, that I felt it important to try and delineate what the two leaders want — particularly Mr Xi.
First, as I have previously argued, ideally, Mr Xi would want to call an end to the war in Ukraine. Initially, it may have served a purpose for China in trying to put Russia and the West at loggerheads, weakening both through either conflict or proxy conflict. But I think China now sees the real prospect of a catastrophic defeat for Russia, and perhaps a regime change there, with Mr Putin being ousted for something likely less aligned with China.
That would be a disaster for China, leaving the country further encircled by its foes. So, while Mr Xi would love to push a peace deal, the only real interest here is saving Mr Putin — not viewing all this through any Ukrainian prism.
Indeed, having done little to engage with Ukraine over the period since independence, Chinese officials simply don’t understand Ukraine and don’t particularly want to. That’s a problem when it comes to forcing a peace on Ukraine; if China does not understand the Ukrainian perspective, how can it find a solution that is amenable to Kyiv?
Second, even if Mr Xi cannot secure lasting peace, or at least a ceasefire, China thinks it will still win plaudits in the global south, and perhaps even Europe, just for trying. In what it sees as an increasingly polarised world, China hopes to pull elements of the global south and even Europe, away from the US-led Western alliance by marketing itself as a global peacemaker and neutral arbiter — even though it clearly is not.
Third, if Mr Xi cannot secure a peace agreement, he will want to enforce guardrails on Mr Putin that limit risks of escalation away from anything that can destabilise the global economy. It is important to remember that China’s long-term game plan is still to win global hegemony over the US through economic development and globalisation. China, therefore, hates anything that undermines the global status quo. This war has spiked global commodity prices, hurt supply chains, and hit global trade and growth — all of which is bad for China’s hegemony bid through economic development.
Fourth, Mr Xi knows Mr Putin is both desperate and increasingly dependent on China. If Russia is willing to offer China cut-price long-term commodity deals, all the better. China will take whatever it can from a weakened Mr Putin.
Fifth, in the “partnership without limits” agreement signed at the February 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the two sides had very different interpretations of the weights of the two partners. Mr Putin saw this as a partnership of equals at the very least, whereas Mr Xi definitely saw China as the big brother and dominant partner. This caused irritation from both sides at the time, and Mr Xi will want to rub it in that a year later, Mr Putin is undeniably the weaker, junior partner and dependent on Mr Xi.
Sixth, I think Mr Xi will want to signal to the US that China has leverage over Russia, and that if the US and its allies want peace in Ukraine, it will have to work with China. That likely means that China will look for compromises from the US elsewhere, perhaps over tariffs and trade — perhaps even on Taiwan.
Seventh, and importantly, China does not want to get dragged into the conflict. It knows full well that when powers have been dragged into wars, such as Russia and the US in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and now Ukraine, they have emerged much weaker.
So, that’s Mr Xi, but what about Mr Putin?
He has by now realised that Russia cannot win this conflict; it has no path to victory. So, Mr Putin really has only two options. The first one is to secure full backing from Beijing for his conquest of Ukraine. Ideally that would be Chinese military support to push the Ukrainians back and deliver full victory in Ukraine. Mr Putin perhaps feels that even the Chinese lining up on his side in Ukraine could be enough to frighten the West off into backing off in support for Ukraine, and then eventual Ukrainian surrender to Russia.
The second option is that if Chinese military backing is not forthcoming (and it likely is not), Mr Putin wants China to force Ukraine and the West to the negotiating table to bring peace. He would now take a peace in Ukraine where he keeps what he has, ideally forcing guarantees of no future NATO enlargement and some limits on Ukraine’s rearmament.
The latter would be aimed at giving a future option of Russia rearming and then re-invading Ukraine — something that is in no way acceptable to Ukraine. But I still think that Mr Putin is now so weak and vulnerable that he might just be forced to concede to a deal whereby Russian forces withdraw to positions held before February 24, 2022. This would precede longer-term UN negotiations over the future of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘Peoples’ Republics’, accompanied by some formula around no NATO membership for Ukraine in exchange or some form of Western security guarantees for Ukraine.
Timothy Ash is an associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House and a senior sovereign strategist at Bluebay Asset Management
